



Stop LAPD Spying Coalition

April 15, 2025

Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners
100 West First Street, Suite 134
Los Angeles, California 90012

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Commissioners:

We write with urgency in regard to LAPD's assertions and presentations in 2025 about how LAPD works with federal immigration agents.

In December, Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass signed Ordinance 188441,¹ which was unanimously passed by the LA City Council and prohibits using any city resources for immigration enforcement. While both Mayor Bass and City Council celebrated the ordinance as a major achievement in making Los Angeles a "sanctuary,"² LAPD is asserting it will have no effect on department policies.

The purpose of this letter is to outline all of the ways that LAPD will be facilitating the Trump administration's targeting and deportation of people in our communities, including by sharing personnel, resources, and information with federal authorities. These tactics and policies will mean that City of Los Angeles personnel are doing the legwork for the Trump administration's agenda of terrorizing and destroying our immigrant communities.

If LAPD's current policies remain unchanged, then the city's role in that cruel agenda will increase – while at the same time city officials mislead our communities by falsely assuring them that Los Angeles is a "sanctuary" where city resources are not contributing to civil immigration enforcement by the Trump administration. This lie is more dangerous than saying nothing at all, since it misleads the public and gives false assurance and comfort to communities facing deliberate terror and chaos at the hands of federal authorities.

Much of LAPD's current role in immigration enforcement appears to be designed by Arif Alikhan, a former Department of Homeland Security official who helped shape Ordinance 188441. After the ordinance was enacted, LAPD declared in an "Enforcement of United States Immigration Laws" FAQ that Alikhan appears to have authored that the new law does nothing to change LAPD's policies. Alikhan elaborated to the BOPC last

¹ https://clkrep.lacity.org/online/docs/2023/23-0243_misc_11-12-24.pdf

² <https://cd4.lacity.gov/press-releases/city-council-votes-to-establish-los-angeles-as-a-sanctuary-city/>

month that the ordinance “largely reflects the policies that have existed with the LAPD for many years” because “the department does not engage in nor support, or provide assistance to any civil immigration enforcement.”

In contrast to these assurances, we must be clear about the details of LAPD’s collaboration with immigration authorities. While LAPD frequently references a 1979 special order³ that restricts police from initiating action with the exclusive goal of learning a person’s immigration status or from arresting a person for unlawfully entering the US with regard to immigration policy, the truth is that every single day LAPD is taking action that facilitates these exact same goals in collaboration with federal agents.

This collaboration has a long and well-documented history. In 2000, LAPD was exposed as coordinating with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) so closely that one officer described it as “routine” for “an INS agent in the CRASH office do a laptop search on a detainee’s immigration status.”⁴ (CRASH refers to LAPD “gang intelligence units” that were disbanded and replaced by the Gang and Narcotics Division.) Likewise, as of 2014, LAPD was granting approximately 40% of detainer requests it received from ICE, resulting in hundreds of deportations annually.⁵ And while LAPD today claims it does not honor ICE detainer requests, ICE still sends these requests⁶ and is notified any time a person is booked by LAPD into the Los Angeles County Criminal Booking System.⁷

We must be clear about the current realities of LAPD’s role in the Trump administration’s agenda or else the city is providing our communities false assurances while putting them in harm’s way. Below are several of the ways that LAPD is currently facilitating – and is set to continue facilitating – federal immigration arrests and raids.

1. LAPD acts as an information gatherer and tracker for immigration agencies.

Funded by federal grants, private donations, and city funding, LAPD has amassed an arsenal of both digital and analog surveillance, data-storing, and data-sharing technologies that target our communities en masse, regardless of a person’s proximity to crime or intent:

- **Field Interview Cards** or FI cards are a primary data-gathering tool of the LAPD for a wealth of intimate information on a person, including name, address, email address, physical characteristics, gang affiliations, date, time, location, who a person was with, what they were wearing, the presence of tattoos and other identifying marks, a person’s social media handles, and anything else an officer thinks is “relevant.” Collected over time, FI cards have long been used by LAPD to track a person’s movements and social relationships. Today LAPD officers are able to fill out FI cards directly on their tablets or phones, for immediate input into its Records Management System (RMS), which interfaces with local, state, and federal agencies through a range of databases and communication platforms, including Coplink, LInX, Justice Data Interface Controller (JDIC), Guardian, the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC).⁸ Of these data systems, ICE is able to access NCIC directly, and accesses information in Coplink indirectly through other data servers⁹. In addition to providing information to federal agencies via these means,

³ https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/2021/12/SO_40.pdf

⁴ <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-feb-29-mn-3691-story.html>

⁵ <https://laist.com/shows/take-two/los-angeles-to-require-judicial-oversight-for-ice-holds>

⁶ https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/050724/BPC_24-085.pdf

⁷ <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txsd.1821703/gov.uscourts.txsd.1821703.98.1.pdf>

⁸ https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2022/C-140743_c_7-1-22.pdf

⁹ <https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Nlets-Q-and-A-1.pdf>

LAPD has been exposed as falsifying information¹⁰ on FI cards and filling out FI cards more frequently during detainments when the person is perceived to be Black, “multiracial,” or Hispanic/Latinx.¹¹

- **Body-Worn Video and Digital In-Car Video Systems (DICVS)** gathers people’s faces, appearances, locations, license plates, and other information and uploads the data to Evidence.com, which is also part of LAPD’s Records Management System (RMS) and accessible by other agencies that use the same platforms. BWV is also used during field interviews to “capture additional details regarding a person’s clothing, tattoos, or physical description that may not fit in the limited space provided on an FI card.”¹²
- **Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR)** are used to track people’s movements and predict where a person lives, works, or may be going. These scans are kept for years regardless of a person’s proximity to crime. As described in our March 2, 2025 letter¹³ to the Board, LAPD captures and has access to license plate reader information through at least three different ALPR systems and the data is shared with federal agencies through data-sharing systems including the RMS¹⁴ and Peregrine Technologies¹⁵¹⁶.
- **Cellebrite** systems and software are used to extract information from a person’s phone, including all contacts, photos, passwords, social media accounts, files, and communications. Cellebrite has been used in Los Angeles since at least 2012¹⁷ including by multi-agency task force where LAPD personnel collaborate with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and ICE personnel. Data obtained from a cell phone using Cellebrite has historically been shared with federal agencies by LAPD through such data-sharing platforms as Palantir, which today has been replaced by Peregrine Technologies.
- **Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)** is a report that someone generates about “activity” they deem to be “suspicious.” Once filed through various reporting systems including the iWATCH - See Something, Say Something program and LAPD police reports, SARs are stored and shared with thousands of law enforcement and public agencies as well as private contractors through regional surveillance hubs known as fusion centers, where the data is maintained for 30 years.
- **Social media surveillance** - LAPD has a long history of online and social media surveillance, including creating fake personas to more closely monitor a person’s online communications and the use of surveillance software including Voyager Labs,¹⁸ Dataminr, Cobwebs, and Geofeedia.¹⁹ The software is used to surveil not only individuals, organizations, and events but to gather potential “intelligence” and data that might be used to build a case against a person in the future.

Data and images from the above sources are stored in LAPD databases that are accessible to local law enforcement and federal agencies, either directly or through the local fusion center JRIC (the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, described in more detail below). LAPD also provides records to federal databases and/or platforms that are accessible to ICE, including Coplink and the FBI’s National Crime Information Center

¹⁰ <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-26/lapd-division-gang-framing-scandal>

¹¹ <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2024.pdf>

¹² https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/092121/BPC_21-166.pdf

¹³ <https://stoplapdspying.org/alpr-letter/>

¹⁴ https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2022/C-140743_c_7-1-22.pdf

¹⁵ <https://www.bscc.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Los-Angeles-Police-Department.pdf>

¹⁶ <https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/CCDORCTFPPUpdated091323.pdf>

¹⁷ http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/031213/BPC_13-0091.pdf

¹⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/17/los-angeles-police-surveillance-social-media-voyager>

¹⁹ <https://epic.org/dot-la-the-lapd-faces-criticism-for-using-a-surveillance-app-to-target-predominantly-black-neighborhoods/>

(NCIC).²⁰ Software platforms that facilitate data-sharing between LAPD and federal agencies include Motorola's PremierOne Records Management System (RMS),²¹ Evidence.com, Motorola's Vigilant Solutions, and Peregrine Technologies.²²

2. LAPD shares real-time data with federal agencies through fusion centers.

As detailed in our March 2nd letter to the Board,²³ fusion centers are surveillance and data-sharing hubs that tie different agencies into a National Information Sharing Environment (ISE).²⁴ LAPD is a "major contributor of personnel" to staffing of the Los Angeles area fusion center, known as Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC).²⁵ LAPD has an agreement to share intelligence JRIC and the JDIG "merged to create a consolidated, regional all-crimes intelligence entity."²⁶

JRIC's whole purpose is enabling local police agencies like LAPD to provide federal authorities including ICE direct access to the City of Los Angeles's data, personnel, and technologies.²⁷²⁸ This routine collaboration is described in the 2012 report Zones of Opacity: Data Fusion in Post 9/11 information, surveillance streams, data, and resources with other JRIC members, which include the FBI, DHS, and ICE. As stated in an MOU signed by LAPD Chief Charlie Beck in 2015, the JRIC "combines the intelligence and information sharing of all participating agencies."²⁹

In addition to being a DHS fusion center, JRIC was established in the same building as the Los Angeles Joint Drug Intelligence Group (JDIG), a task force responsible for further local and federal police collaboration policing. In fact, the FBI's Assistant Director of Public Affairs explained in 2009 that Norwalk was chosen as the location for JRIC due to proximity to JDIG, in order to enable seamless information sharing between the two organizations.³⁰ And in 2010, the Security Organizations³¹ which drew from 55 interviews at 36 fusion centers:

"According to a ranking officer at a fusion centre, 'The true benefit is to have those agents from the different agencies sitting next to each other with all of their datasets, all their legacy and their parent agency data, piped right to their desk. You'd have a DEA Intel analyst sitting next to an ICE Intel analyst sitting next to a DHS border analyst, and they all have their agency data right at their fingertips. That's the true value of fusion.' Because each analyst possesses the requisite security clearance for his or her agency's databases and can access those databases remotely, this facilitates rapid information exchange. There is no need to call the FBI, for instance, when an FBI analyst is sitting right next to you and can pull up any information you require."

²⁰ <https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Nlets-Q-and-A-1.pdf>

²¹ https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/051022/BPC_22-093.pdf

²² https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2024/C-145843_c_07-26-24.pdf

²³ <https://stoplapdspying.org/alpr-letter/>

²⁴ [ISE Functional Standards 1.5.5 - 2015.pdf](#)

²⁵ https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/091024/BPC_24-219.pdf

²⁶ <https://www.jric.org/ScreenPrintInfoPage.aspx?menuitemid=265&menusubid=111&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>

²⁷ <https://www.govtech.com/em/disaster/fusing-intelligence.html>

²⁸ https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/hidta_2011.pdf

²⁹ [MOU JRIC 2016 7-25-2020.PDF](#)

³⁰ [Fusing Intelligence](#)

³¹ [Zones of Opacity: Data Fusion in Post-9/11 Security Organizations*](#)

Software platforms like Palantir, a powerful data integration, sharing, and analysis platform that was used by JRIC from 2009³² until at least 2023,³³ have facilitated this data-sharing. LAPD also used Palantir to facilitate data-sharing with JRIC and over 60 additional law enforcement agencies, the full list of which is known from the original 2012 Palantir contract with LASD.³⁴ Palantir also managed data-sharing between JRIC and additional fusion centers, including the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC).³⁵

Peregrine Technologies is the newest addition to LAPD's digital technology arsenal and has been bought to replace the controversial Palantir software. LAPD had used Palantir to build its "predictive policing" system Operation LASER, which harvested surveillance data to create profiles that LAPD used to target "future" "chronic offenders." In 2023, LAPD began conversations with a team at Peregrine Technologies³⁶ on replacing Palantir and in July 2024 signed a contract with Peregrine to begin integrating its data, including from license plate scans, FI cards, citations, traffic stops, crime reports, data from BWV and Digital In-Car Video, interviews with witnesses, and many additional types of information.

Other local police agencies including in Arcadia, Alhambra, Anaheim, and Glendale have signed similar agreements with Peregrine too. Likewise, as of September 2023 LASD has been looking for a "solution" to replace Palantir at JRIC, "to be used by over 60 LE/public safety agencies throughout the JRIC Area of Responsibility (AOR)."³⁷ Based on the existing data-sharing network and the recent contracts entered by numerous local agencies, it appears likely that Peregrine will become this replacement, enabling local and federal agencies to seamlessly capture, exchange, and funnel data to JRIC, where it will be actionable and accessible to a range of federal agencies including DHS and ICE.

The data shared here includes reports of "suspicious activity" filed by civilians or by police, license plate scans, FI card information, crime reports, financial records, DMV information, social media handles and networks, cell phone numbers and networks, social security numbers, fingerprints and mugshots, jail records and interviews, court documents, and much more; supplemented by such data brokers as LexisNexis and its Risk Solutions Accurint Virtual Crime Center^{38,39} This is accessible to agencies regardless of a person committing any crime or being suspected of a crime. This is the nature and intention of the Information-Sharing Environment.

As an example of this, when LAPD's ALPR system was audited in 2020 by the state's Inspector General,⁴⁰ LAPD was found to be sharing ALPR images with 58 law enforcement agencies and with JRIC through Palantir's Gotham software platform,⁴¹ even though (as the audit noted) LAPD "does not have agreements to share its ALPR images with any federal agencies, including ICE." The audit further noted: "Most of the images collected were unrelated to criminal cases. 99.9% of the 320 million images the LAPD stored came from vehicles that were not on a list of those involved in criminal investigations when the image was made by an ALPR camera."

³² https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/bc/241328_PalantirTechnologies03-29-16.pdf

³³ [los angeles county sheriff's department request for information rfi number 730-sh los](https://losangelescountysheriffsdepartmentrequestforinformationrfi.number.730-sh.los)

³⁴ [Palantir Data Sharing - 2-12-2020.pdf](https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/bc/241328_PalantirDataSharing-2-12-2020.pdf)

³⁵ [Palantir, NCRIC \(Northern California Regional Intelligence Center\) • MuckRock](https://www.palantir.com/resources/case-studies/northern-california-regional-intelligence-center)

³⁶ <https://lacity.nextrequest.com/requests/24-4574>

³⁷ [los angeles county sheriff's department request for information rfi number 730-sh los](https://losangelescountysheriffsdepartmentrequestforinformationrfi.number.730-sh.los)

³⁸ https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2023/C-143522_C_06-13-23.pdf

³⁹ <https://theintercept.com/2022/06/09/ice-lexisnexis-mass-surveillances/>

⁴⁰ [Audit Results](#)

⁴¹ <https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/135540.pdf>

Another significant example is field interview (FI) cards. A person does not have to have committed any crime for LAPD to complete an FI card documenting their identity, location, who they know, appearance, and social media accounts, photographs of intimate tattoos, and even place of birth, “if deemed relevant to an investigation.”⁴² LAPD has described FI cards as being a way to “get them” (meaning people stopped by police) “in the system.”⁴³

Once data is shared with JRIC, it remains there. JRIC’s privacy policy is extremely broad,⁴⁴ stating that the fusion center “may only place information in criminal intelligence files and/or retain information:”

(1) Where there is **reasonable suspicion that a specific individual or organization has committed or is supporting or facilitating a criminal offense or is involved in or is planning** criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, California, or the nation and the information is relevant to the criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity; or, (2) Where there is a **reasonable likelihood that within one year there will develop a reasonable suspicion** that a specific individual or organization has committed a criminal offense or is involved in or is planning criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, California, or the nation and the information is relevant to the criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity.”

The standard for filing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) that gets stored by JRIC is even vaguer: “official documentation of **observed behavior reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.**” Once filed, these reports are maintained in the FBI’s Case Support System for 30 years, even after there is determined to be “no nexus to terrorism.”⁴⁵

These are the data-sharing systems, policies, and agreements that LAPD uses to supply surveillance information about communities in Los Angeles with federal agencies. This infrastructure makes it impossible to separate LAPD from immigration enforcement. So long as this infrastructure remains in place, city officials are lying to the public and providing false assurance when they claim Los Angeles is not contributing resources and personnel are not contributing to civil immigration enforcement.

3. LAPD arbitrarily labels immigrants as “gang affiliated” which then becomes a basis for federal authorities to detain, banish, and torture them.

One of LAPD’s longstanding (and long criticized) means of criminalizing both people and places in the city is through arbitrary or false labels of “gang affiliation.” The ramifications of this label have always been deadly, and the data itself and the process by which a person may be labelled as a gang member is deeply flawed, as exposed in repeated audits by both community groups⁴⁶ and state officials.⁴⁷ In 2020, LAPD was further exposed as fabricating gang affiliation on FI cards.⁴⁸

While these scandals have resulted in LAPD being banned from adding information to the statewide CalGang database, officers continue to gather the same information through FI cards and this information is made

⁴² https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/092121/BPC_21-166.pdf

⁴³ [Predict and Surveil - Sarah Brayne - Oxford University Press](#)

⁴⁴ <https://nfcausa.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Joint-Regional-Intelligence-Center-JRIC.pdf>

⁴⁵ <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1D954eqGeJXVT64t24eYOLkrcItOaiZWv/view?usp=sharing>

⁴⁶ <https://youthjusticela.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/TrackedandTrapped-1.pdf>

⁴⁷ <https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-calgangs-audit-20160811-snap-story.html>

⁴⁸ <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-02/three-more-lapd-officers-charged-with-falsifying-information-in-gang-labeling-scandal>

available to federal authorities through the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and fusion centers. Photos indicating that a person has tattoos are captured and shared through the FI card database (for anyone stopped and interviewed by police), as well as the Los Angeles County Criminal Booking System (for anyone arrested, no matter if the charge proves false or gets thrown out in court).

This information sharing is especially troubling as the federal government is seeking to detain and deport people through any means that they decide, with a focus on immigrants and individuals who have spoken out against US policies and actions as well as examples of people arbitrarily banished solely on the basis of a tattoo. In the case of over 200 Venezuelans who were flown to a high-security prison in El Salvador last month, ICE is justifying its actions by claiming the individuals were gang members, many of whom were apparently “identified” as such by having a tattoo. Family members and the individuals themselves have vehemently denied these allegations of gang affiliations and shown that the tattoos have no connection to gang membership.⁴⁹

4. LAPD reports on individuals through Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and the DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) mobile app reporting system.

LAPD encourages the reporting of “suspicious activity” through the (SAR) and iWATCH programs,⁵⁰ together promoted as “See Something, Say Something.” Through these programs, LAPD encourages community members to profile people based on race, gender presentation, neighborhood, ethnicity, and other factors, and to report anyone they see that they feel even slightly suspicious of to police under the guise of “preventing terrorist attacks.” LAPD funnels these reports to JRIC, where they are analyzed for a potential “nexus to terrorism” or criminality.

LAPD additionally shares information with federal agencies and fusion centers using the DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and mobile app reporting system. HSIN was created by DHS “for trusted sharing of Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information”⁵¹ and for “**suspicious incident and pre-incident information, 24/7 situational awareness, unclassified bulletins, alerts, and analysis reports.**”⁵² In addition to using HSIN to share information between agencies,⁵³ an LAPD training document⁵⁴ shows that LAPD captains are directed to use HSIN for the sharing of “real time information” they have obtained from social media surveillance, including the identification of “protestors via posts and live feeds.” Data shared through HSIN is reported to fusion centers - a 2011 Request for Proposals for the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) described HSIN as a “collaborative system used by the DHS Operations Center to collect and disseminate information between DHS and local, state, tribal, and federal agencies.”⁵⁵

This means individuals are reported to federal agencies and fusion centers by LAPD for lawful political activities that may have no proximity to crime.

5. LAPD participates with federal agencies on a wide range of multi-agency task forces, sharing information and resources that can result in “collateral arrests.”

⁴⁹ <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombian-venezuelan-migrant-held-el-salvador-has-no-ties-feared-gang-wife-says-2025-03-20/>; <https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/dcc-boasberg-deportation-order.pdf>

⁵⁰ <https://www.lapdonline.org/office-of-the-chief-of-police/office-of-special-operations/what-suspicious-behaviors-and-activities-should-you-report/>

⁵¹ <https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network-hsin>

⁵² Appendix C, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-12_Dec08.pdf

⁵³ [Homeland Security Information Network \(HSIN\) FY22 Annual Report](#)

⁵⁴ [LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT Command Officer Development 1850-10819 Expanded Course Outline](#)

⁵⁵ <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XeP4aseUp7vN65YQDRygUvKkRdQOBPh1/view?usp=sharing>

LAPD's March 4, 2025 presentation to BOPC⁵⁶ acknowledged that LAPD officers work side-by-side with ICE and HSI agents on thousands of instances of joint federal-local task forces – by the department's estimate, its officers have participated in 5809 inter-agency task forces since 2018. Both LAPD and ICE are members of many of these task forces, with local personnel deputized to work out of federal offices using federal resources as federal “task force officers”⁵⁷

While LAPD admitted in its March 4 presentation that its close collaboration with federal authorities includes task forces where ICE or HSI are seeking to arrest someone, it claimed it does not “assist.” But a November 2022 document⁵⁸ submitted to BOPC by LAPD noted that one such task force is located within the ICE and HSI regional headquarters in Long Beach, to allow collaboration as well “access to the forensic capabilities and laboratory housed within HSI.” Local police assigned to this task force are considered “members of the HSI Task Force with cross federal status” who “have become Task Force Officers, allowing them to facilitate investigations and computer forensic examinations beyond the City boundaries.” Another task force states that it has been gathering and sharing data including license plate scans and video surveillance feeds, all through Peregrine software, approved by the BOPC and City Council.⁵⁹

Once again, as the Trump administration seeks to weaponize every federal agency, resource, and program in pursuit of its political agenda, there is no doubt that LAPD officers will provide direct and official support to this work.

6. LAPD acts as an alert for DHS and ICE by sending fingerprints of every person booked into custody.

Immigration enforcement can't happen without a vast network of local police and prosecutors who serve as the federal government's eyes and ears on the ground, ensuring that any person booked into custody for any arrest – no matter how trivial and no matter if ultimately false or thrown out in court – is immediately put on ICE's radar. ICE describes this process as follows:

“ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) typically learns that a possible foreign national has been taken into federal, state, local, or tribal criminal custody through an automated nationwide federal information sharing program referred to as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)/DHS Interoperability. After an individual is fingerprinted during the booking process, his or her fingerprints are sent to the FBI, after which they are automatically transmitted to DHS's Automated Biometric Identity System (IDENT). If there is a match in IDENT, information about that individual is automatically sent to ICE in near-real time as a biometric Immigration Alien Query (IAQ).”⁶⁰

After receiving this information, ICE can potentially access jail booking data through a program created by LexisNexis called the Accurint Virtual Crime Center, though it is not clear if Accurint has access to this information in Los Angeles County. LexisNexis describes this as “real-time incarceration and arrest data . . . you will access jail booking data, including over 140 million booking records and 38 million offender images from 2,000+ law enforcement databases nationwide. . . . We add over 1 million new records each month. This

⁵⁶ https://youtu.be/L0GD6GOjwPs?si=QFJvqtvR_BsiYWM3

⁵⁷ [A View from the CT Foxhole: Deputy Chief David Kowalski, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department](#)

⁵⁸ https://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/120622/BPC_22-264.pdf

⁵⁹ <https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/CCDORCTFPPUpdated091323.pdf>

⁶⁰ <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txsd.1821703/gov.uscourts.txsd.1821703.98.1.pdf>

equates to approximately 85% of all incarcerations in the United States.”⁶¹ Both ICE and CBP have contracts to use this database.⁶² The City of Los Angeles additionally funds and supports LexisNexis through contracts for Accurant for LAPD that have been in place from 2006⁶³ to today.⁶⁴ Accurant provides users with access to a wide range of records including data from credit agencies, cellphone registries, social-media posts, property records, utility accounts, fishing licenses, internet chat rooms and bankruptcy filings, and ALPR plate scans from Vigilant Technologies.⁶⁵ Even without access to “real time incarceration data” and in situations where law enforcement does not honor ICE detainers, ICE can make arrests in communities after a person’s release from custody.⁶⁶

* * *

In sum, there are many large, systemic, and direct ways that the Los Angeles Police Department is participating in the targeting and banishment of immigrant communities in Los Angeles, even without any proximity to “crime.”

LAPD’s close relationship with JRIC, federal agencies, and task forces means that any data that is obtained by LAPD will become accessible to federal immigration authorities. The only way LAPD cannot share information with federal agencies is if LAPD doesn’t have information to share. This is why our communities keep fighting LAPD’s acquisition of resources, technology, and funding to gather even more data on us that will be used to either pursue or justify a stop, search, detention, or exile of a person by federal authorities.

This is an enormous danger, and every LAPD agreement, technology contract, grant application, and request to accept a donation that facilitated it was approved by the Board of Police Commissioners and City Council. This is the same City Council that claims to restrict cooperation and sharing of city resources with ICE and immigration authorities. As LAPD has confirmed in no uncertain terms, City Council’s “sanctuary” assurances and declarations are false and will not entail any change in policy. LAPD’s close collaboration with ICE and other federal authorities will remain business as usual, working side-by-side with ICE and sharing information and resources as fast as technology will allow, soon to be additionally facilitated through the next and latest Real Time Crime Centers (RTCCs) – which promise safety by funneling as much surveillance information about communities as possible into LAPD RTCCs.

We agree that the city’s resources should not be used for immigration enforcement but instead provide for the primary needs of residents, with a focus on those most marginalized. Unless Mayor Bass and City Council are willing to terminate the many LAPD policies, programs, and technologies that serve our family members, neighbors, and loved ones up to federal authorities, the city should declare that it has no qualms about offering city resources and personnel to the Trump administration’s agenda of terrorizing immigrant communities.

Sincerely,



Hamid Khan

Stop LAPD Spying Coalition

Cc:

⁶¹ <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/62c3198c117dd661bd99eb3a/t/636028a311990867c6077887/1667246243453/Data-Brokers-Fact-Sheet-Final-6.8.22.pdf>

⁶² <https://risk.lexisnexis.com/government/our-services-for-homeland-security>

⁶³ <https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/index.cfm?fa=ccon.viewrecord&contractnum=C-110289>

⁶⁴ <https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/index.cfm?fa=ccon.viewrecord&contractnum=C-143522>

⁶⁵ [Lawyers and Scholars to LexisNexis, Thomson Reuters: Stop Helping ICE Deport People](#)

⁶⁶ <https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/uscis-assisted-in-ice-investigation-leading-to-arrest-of-370-alien-offenders-in-massachusetts>

Jim McDonnell - Chief, Los Angeles Police Department
Django Sibley - Executive Director, Los Angeles Police Commission

Karen Bass – Mayor, City of Los Angeles

Eunisses Hernandez – Councilmember District 1
Adrin Nazarian – Councilmember District 2
Bob Blumenfield – Councilmember District 3
Nithya Raman – Councilmember District 4
Katy Yaroslavsky – Councilmember District 5
Imelda Padilla – Councilmember District 6
Monica Rodriguez – Councilmember District 7
Marqueece Harris-Dawson – Councilmember District 8
Curren Price, Jr. – Councilmember District 9
Heather Hutt – Councilmember District 10
Traci Park – Councilmember District 11
John Lee – Councilmember District 12
Hugo Soto-Martinez – Councilmember District 13
Ysabel Jurado – Councilmember District 14
Tim McOsker – Councilmember District 15